(720 ILCS 5/Art. 9 heading)
ARTICLE 9.
HOMICIDE
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(720 ILCS 5/9-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)
Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder - Death penalties - Exceptions - Separate
Hearings - Proof - Findings - Appellate procedures - Reversals.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm
| | to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
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| (2) he knows that such acts create a strong
| | probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
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| (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
| | other than second degree murder.
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| (b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has
been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
| | fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or
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| (2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
| | institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
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| (3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
| | or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or
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| (4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of
| | the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
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| (5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
| | contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or
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| (6) the murdered individual was killed in the course
| | (a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally
| | inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and
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| (b) in performing the acts which caused the death
| | of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
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| (c) the other felony was an inherently violent
| | crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or
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| (7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age
| | and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
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| (8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
| | prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
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| (9) the defendant, while committing an offense
| | punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
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| (10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution
| | or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
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| (11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated
| | and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or
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| (12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical
| | technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; or
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| (13) the defendant was a principal administrator,
| | organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person; or
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| (14) the murder was intentional and involved the
| | infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
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| (15) the murder was committed as a result of the
| | intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle; or
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| (16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
| | older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
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| (17) the murdered individual was a disabled person
| | and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
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| (18) the murder was committed by reason of any
| | person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer; or
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| (19) the murdered individual was subject to an order
| | of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
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| (20) the murdered individual was known by the
| | defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
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| (21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
| | connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code.
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| (b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder and who at the time of the commission of the offense had attained the age of 18 years or more may be sentenced to natural life imprisonment if
(i) the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, (ii) the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, and (iii) the murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation
for his or her acting in that capacity.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any
aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the
imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but
need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b).
Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior
| | (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was
| | under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
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| (3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
| | defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
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| (4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of
| | threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
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| (5) the defendant was not personally present during
| | commission of the act or acts causing death;
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| (6) the defendant's background includes a history of
| | extreme emotional or physical abuse;
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| (7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
| | (d) Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in
subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as
indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
| | (2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
| | A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
| | B. the defendant was convicted after a trial
| | before the court sitting without a jury; or
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| C. the court for good cause shown discharges the
| | jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
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| (3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a
| | jury for the separate proceeding.
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| (e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors
set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by either the State or the
defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at
criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating
factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be
presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.
The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any
information received at the hearing.
(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the
factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be
satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.
(g) Procedure - Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified
Code of Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that
one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, the jury
shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the
court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be
imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing
including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon,
along with any relevant
documents, that compelled the court to non-concur with the sentence. This
document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate
review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination.
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more
jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence,
the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) Procedure - No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none
of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified
Code of Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in
subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any aggravating and
mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). If the Court
determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that
death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the
defendant to death.
If
the court finds that death is not the
appropriate sentence, the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder
by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks
the death penalty as an appropriate
sentence,
on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court
may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only
evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony
of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or
that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single
accomplice without any other corroborating evidence.
If the court decertifies the case as a capital case
under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a
written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not
decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the
eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.
(i) Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the
imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally
unjust as applied to the particular case.
If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the
death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case,
independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court
shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the
State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be
sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing
provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having
jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the
defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and
State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for
procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines
do not
have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10; 96-1475, eff. 1-1-11.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-1.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1.2)
Sec. 9-1.2. Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child.
(a) A person
commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in
performing acts which cause the death of an unborn child, he without lawful
justification:
(1) either intended to cause the death of or do great
| | bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
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(2) knew that his acts created a strong probability
| | of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; and
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(3) knew that the woman was pregnant.
(b) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2)
"person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(c) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an
unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined
in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the
pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which
were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical
practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child
shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that:
(1) the death penalty may not be imposed;
(2) if the person committed the offense while armed
| | with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
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(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the
| | person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
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(4) if, during the commission of the offense, the
| | person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
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(e) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit the
prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.
(Source: P.A. 96-1000, eff. 7-2-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-2)
Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder.
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he or she commits
the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following
mitigating factors are present:
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting
| | under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
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(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the
| | circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.
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(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense
passion in a reasonable person.
(c) When evidence of
either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section
has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant
can be found guilty of second degree murder. The burden of proof, however,
remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence
of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate
the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code.
(d) Sentence. Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-2.1)
Sec. 9-2.1.
Voluntary Manslaughter of an Unborn Child.
(a) A person
who kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary
manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting
under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation by
another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or
accidentally causes the death of the unborn child.
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in
a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child
commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the
killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed,
would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in
Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
(c) Sentence.
Voluntary Manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 1 felony.
(d) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2)
"person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(e) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an
unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined
in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the
pregnant woman has
consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed
pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during
diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(Source: P.A. 84-1414.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-3)
Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful
justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful
or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or
great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly,
except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of
a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft,
in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge
approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e-2) Except as provided in subsection (e-3), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e-3) In cases involving reckless homicide in which (i) the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties and (ii) the defendant causes the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e-5) (Blank).
(e-7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e-8), in cases involving
reckless homicide in which the defendant: (1)
was
driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1
of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control,
the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e-8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct and: (1) was
driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1
of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control,
the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e-9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge
approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as
part of a single course of conduct,
the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(e-10) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide resulting in the death of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(e-11)
In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant unintentionally kills an individual while driving in a posted school zone, as defined in Section 11-605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, while children are present or in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, when construction or maintenance workers are present the trier of fact may infer that the defendant's actions were performed recklessly where he or she was also either driving at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit or violating Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(e-12) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e-13), in cases involving
reckless homicide in which the offense was committed as result
of a violation of subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e-13) In cases involving
reckless homicide in which the offense was committed as result
of a violation of subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and the defendant caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as
part of a single course of conduct,
the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e-14)
In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant unintentionally kills an individual, the trier of fact may infer that the defendant's actions were performed recklessly where he or she was also violating subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The penalty for a reckless homicide in which the driver also violated subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a
family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A-3 of the
Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a
person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(Source: P.A. 95-467, eff. 6-1-08; 95-551, eff. 6-1-08; 95-587, eff. 6-1-08; 95-591, eff. 9-10-07; 95-803, eff. 1-1-09; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08; 95-884, eff. 1-1-09; 96-328, eff. 8-11-09.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-3.1)
Sec. 9-3.1.
(Renumbered).
(Source: Renumbered by P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3-1.5)
Sec. 9-3-1.5. (Renumbered as Section 9-3.5).
(Source: Renumbered by P.A. 97-333, eff. 8-12-11.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-3.2)
Sec. 9-3.2.
Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide of an
Unborn Child. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an unborn child
without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter of an unborn
child if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such
as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and
he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of death
consists of the driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person
commits reckless homicide of an unborn child.
(b) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.
(c) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2)
"person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(d) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an
unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined
in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the
pregnant woman has
consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed
pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during
diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(e) The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to prohibit
the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law, nor shall
it be construed to preclude any civil cause of action.
(Source: P.A. 84-1414.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3.3) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-3.3)
Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide.
(a) A person who violates Section
401 of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled
substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection,
inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance, commits the
offense of drug-induced homicide.
(b) Sentence. Drug-induced homicide is a Class X felony.
(c) A person who commits drug-induced homicide by violating subsection (a)
or subsection (c) of Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act
commits a Class X felony for which the
defendant shall in addition to a sentence authorized by law, be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and not more than 30
years or an extended term of not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years.
(Source: P.A. 97-191, eff. 7-22-11.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3.4) (was 720 ILCS 5/9-3.1)
Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death.
(a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when
he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other
person has died by homicidal means.
(b) Nothing in this Section prevents the defendant from also being
charged with and tried for the first degree murder, second degree
murder, or involuntary manslaughter of the person whose
death is concealed.
(b-5) For purposes of this Section:
"Conceal" means the performing of some act or acts for the purpose of preventing or
delaying the discovery of a death by homicidal means. "Conceal" means something more than
simply withholding knowledge or failing to disclose information.
"Homicidal means" means any act or acts, lawful
or unlawful, of a person that cause the death of another person.
(c) Sentence. Concealment of homicidal death is a Class 3 felony.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
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(720 ILCS 5/9-3.5)
Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death.
(a) For purposes of this Section, "conceal" means the performing of some act or acts for the purpose of preventing or delaying the discovery of a death. "Conceal" means something more than simply withholding knowledge or failing to disclose information.
(b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.
(c) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly moves the body of a dead person from its place of death, with the intent of concealing information regarding the place or manner of death of that person, or the identity of any person with information regarding the death of that person. This subsection shall not apply to any movement of the body of a dead person by medical personnel, fire fighters, law enforcement officers, coroners, medical examiners, or licensed funeral directors, or by any person acting at the direction of medical personnel, fire fighters, law enforcement officers, coroners, medical examiners, or licensed funeral directors.
(d) Sentence. Concealment of death is a Class 4 felony.
(Source: P.A. 96-1361, eff. 1-1-11; 97-333, eff. 8-12-11.)
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